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Abstract
In many developing countries, unexpected income shocks are common, formal insurance
is absent, and informal inter-household risk-sharing networks are unable to provide full in-
surance. An important question is therefore whether risk sharing within the household is
e¤ective. I conducted a eld experiment in Western Kenya in which 142 married couples were
followed for approximately 8 weeks. Every week, each individual had a 50% chance of receiv-
ing an income shock equivalent to a few daysincome. Since these shocks are, by denition,
small relative to lifetime income, they should not a¤ect intra-household bargaining power
and should only a¤ect a Pareto e¢ cient household through the pooled budget constraint.
However, I nd that men increase their private consumption when they receive the shock
but not when their wives do, a rejection of e¢ ciency. I present evidence that such behavior
is not specic to the experiment - both husbands and wives spend more on themselves in
weeks in which their labor income is higher. The results suggest that insurance is limited
even within the households in this sample.
JEL Classication: C93, D13, D61, O12
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1 Introduction
Individuals in developing countries are subject to considerable risk but most lack access to formal
mechanisms that would allow them to insure themselves against unexpected income shocks.
Instead, households often use informal systems of gifts and loans to pool idiosyncratic risk. While
these informal networks do provide some protection against shocks, they also face substantial
problems of asymmetric information and payment enforceability, and existing evidence suggests
that inter-household risk sharing networks are rarely, if ever, e¢ cient (Townsend, 1994; Udry,
1994; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003).
In the absence of e¤ective formal or informal inter-household insurance mechanisms, a nat-
ural place for individuals to choose to cope with risk is within the household. Though such
arrangements will be somewhat limited because income shocks are likely to be correlated within
households, whether these mechanisms are e¤ective in insuring the idiosyncratic risk that re-
mains is an important question. In particular, since information and enforcement are presumably
better within a single household than between di¤erent households, intra-household insurance
is the "best hope" for an informal insurance scheme to overcome information and payment en-
forceability problems. If risk is not insured even within the household, despite the substantial
incentives household members should have to insure each other in the absence of other risk-
coping strategies, then programs which impact the ability of individuals to cope with risk will
likely have large welfare impacts (such as formal savings accounts or microinsurance programs).
This paper presents results from a eld experiment in Kenya designed to directly test whether
intra-household risk-sharing arrangements are e¢ cient. The experiment followed 142 married
couples for 8 weeks. Every week, each individual had a 50% chance of receiving a 150 Kenyan
shilling (US $2) income shock, equivalent to roughly 1.5 days income for men and 1 weeks
income for women. As these shocks are, by denition, random, transitory, and idiosyncratic,
the experimental design makes it possible to directly and simply test for allocative e¢ ciency,
by comparing the di¤erence in the responsiveness of private consumption to shocks received
by an individual and to those received by his spouse. The empirical approach is based on the
assumption that, even though men and women may have very di¤erent preferences, the shocks
are too small (relative to lifetime income) to a¤ect intra-household bargaining power. This is
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in contrast to larger income shocks which may well a¤ect bargaining power and, by extension,
consumption decisions.1 While responses to permanent income shocks suggest di¤erences in
intra-household preferences, they do not necessarily indicate ine¢ ciency. In regards to transitory
shocks, however, assuming that household members are risk averse, failing to insure these shocks
would leave potential gains from trade unexploited, and would constitute a rejection of the
collective model of the household (Chiappori, 1992; Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Browning
et al., 1994)), which is based on the assumption that even if spouses have di¤erent preferences
and bargain over outcomes, they are still able to achieve a Pareto e¢ cient outcome.
In the context of this experiment, if the household pools risk e¢ ciently, increases in private
consumption should be the same for shocks received by an individual and those received by
his spouse. However, I nd that husbands increase their expenditures on privately consumed
goods in weeks in which they receive the shock but do not change their expenditures in weeks in
which their wives receive the shock, a rejection of Pareto e¢ ciency. I do not detect statistically
signicant di¤erences for women. These general results are robust to examining changes over
several weeks rather than to just the week in which the shock was received.
This paper contributes to a growing literature in development economics which tests for
intra-household e¢ ciency. These studies typically test for either productive e¢ ciency (that
households maximize prots) or for allocative e¢ ciency (by testing whether allocation decisions
are sensitive to transitory income shocks). The most notable study in the former category is
Udry (1996), who rejects e¢ ciency by showing that inputs could be protably reallocated from
male-controlled plots to female-controlled plots in Burkina Faso.
This paper ts into the second category. All of these studies require the identication of
exogenous, idiosyncratic shocks which a¤ect income realizations but do not a¤ect preferences
or intra-household bargaining power. Thus while the shocks must be substantial enough to be
economically meaningful, they must not be large enough to a¤ect bargaining weights. Typically
1Many studies have shown that household decisions are sensitive to ostensibly exogenous changes in relative
intra-household incomes. Examples include Duo (2003), Thomas (1990), Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997),
and Haddad and Hoddinott (1994). Similarly, Anderson and Baland (2002) argue that intra-household conict
over savings/expenditures is a reason that so many women join ROSCAs in Kenya.
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the shocks which are used are rainfall or weather shocks among agricultural households (Duo
and Udry, 2004; Dubois and Ligon, 2009; Doss, 2001), health shocks (Dercon and Krishnan,
2000; Goldstein, 2004), or agricultural shocks such as pests or plant disease (Goldstein, 2004).
While each of these studies utilizes a di¤erent approach with di¤erent populations, each rejects
e¢ ciency.2
However, the current paper is the only study I am aware of in which the variation in incomes
is explicitly randomized. Thus, while all of these other studies do a convincing job of ruling out
alternative hypotheses for their main ndings (for instance, that aggregate shocks a¤ect relative
prices, or that idiosyncratic health shocks a¤ect preferences directly), this study represents a
particularly direct and straightforward way of testing for e¢ ciency.3
While there are other experimental studies on risk sharing (all of which focus on risk sharing
outside the household), this is the only one (to my knowledge) to work with real-world risk
sharing networks and to observe outcomes outside of a laboratory or other controlled setting.
For instance, Charness and Genicot (2009) examine risk sharing among UCLA undergraduates.
Those studies which work with pre-existing insurance networks include Barr (2003) and Iversen
et al. (2006), which both look at behavior within a controlled experiment among households
which share risk outside the experiment (in Zimbabwe and Uganda, respectively). Similarly,
Chandrasekhar et al. (2010) test for limited commitment and for the role of access to savings
within a controlled experiment in India. The closest study to this one is likely thus Ashraf
(2009), who examines how observability and communication possibilities a¤ect intra-household
savings decisions in the Philippines, though the experiment here focuses on risk rather than on
intra-household savings decisions.
The experimental setup admittedly comes at some cost, however. First, the results come
from a stylized experiment in which all shocks were positive. If people spend windfall income
di¤erently than their regular labor income, the results may not generalize. However, I attempt
2One study from a somewhat more developed country (Mexico) which does not reject e¢ ciency is Bobonis
(2009). The author argues that this may be due to better property rights institutions in Mexico than in the
developing countries studied in other papers (many of which use data from West Africa).
3For instance, see Imbens (2009) for a discussion of how, when it is feasible, randomization is preferable to
observational methods.
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to address this by examining how private expenditures respond to weekly uctuations in labor
income and I nd that both men and women increase private expenditures in weeks in which
their labor income is higher (this increase in response to income shocks is similar to that found by
Duo and Udry (2004) with respect to harvest income shocks). While changes in labor income
in this study are not necessarily exogenous and so should be interpreted with some caution, they
are at least very suggestive that the overall ndings are robust. A second issue is that while I
have detailed data on each household in the sample, there are relatively few households (142)
and all of them were sampled from daily income earners in one part of Western Kenya.
While the welfare consequences of failing to insure these small shocks over a short time
period are not likely to be very large, they suggest that insurance is incomplete, which could
well have important welfare e¤ects. For example, an experiment conducted with a similar group
of daily income earners in this same part of Kenya (but in di¤erent market centers) found that
the inventories of small entrepreneurs are vulnerable to transitory health shocks (Dupas and
Robinson, 2011). However, providing even basic savings accounts mitigated such vulnerability,
and the demand for such accounts was substantial. The ndings in this paper, which suggest
that risk is uninsured even within the household, are therefore complementary, and suggest that
programs which provide more formal risk coping mechanisms could improve welfare.4
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, I lay out a brief motivating framework for interpreting the main results (this
follows from Browning and Chiappori, 1998 and related papers, as well as Duo and Udry,
2004). Under the Pareto e¢ cient collective model of the household, the households optimization
problem can be written as maximizing the following utility function:
max
fqmt;qft;Qtg
TX
t=0
um(qmt; qft; Qt) + uf (qft; qmt; Qt) (1)
4An important question is why insurance is limited in this setting. In an earlier version of this paper, I nd
some suggestive evidence that insurance is constrained by limited commitment though the power of those tests
is low. For evidence of limited commitment in risk sharing agreements, see Coate and Ravallion (1993), Ligon,
Thomas, and Worrall (2002), Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) and Wahhaj (2007).
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subject to the pooled budget constraint:
Wt = RWt 1 + Ymt + Yft + Smt + Sft   p1t(qmt + qft)  p2tQt (2)
For all variables, the subscript m refers to the male and f to the female. The vectors qmt and
qft refer to private consumption, while Qt refers to shared consumption. p1t and p2t are prices
for private and shared consumption, respectively, while Ymt and Yft represent labor income. I
assume here that labor is supplied inelastically, which should be an innocuous assumption given
that it does not respond to the income shocks (as will be shown in the empirical section). Wt is
household wealth, which earns a return R in any period.
The key variables for this experiment are Smt and Sft, the experimental shocks. The key
assumption is that ddSmt =
d
dSft
= 0: receiving the income shocks has no e¤ect on the bargaining
share. This seems plausible given that the shocks represent only a day and a halfs worth of
income for men and a weeks for women. From the pooled budget constraint, then, it is clear
that du1(q1;q2;Q)dS1 =
du1(q1;q2;Q)
dS2
: income shocks should have the same e¤ect on each members
private consumption whether they are received by the husband or the wife.
Empirically, the test for unconstrained Pareto e¢ ciency will be performed by comparing
changes in private consumption between weeks in which the husband receives the shock and
weeks in which the wife receives the shock. Since these shocks are, by denition, transitory,
the Permanent Income Hypothesis suggests that households should choose to intertemporally
smooth their consumption and save the money (as has been tested in, for instance, Paxson,
1992). For this reason, it will only be possible to reject e¢ ciency if personal savings do not
allow for complete intertemporal consumption smoothing.
3 Experimental Design
3.1 Sampling
This project was conducted between April and October 2006 among a sample of 142 couples,
drawn from a group of daily income earners (men who work as bicycle taxi drivers - called boda
bodas in Kiswahili - and women who sell produce and other items in the marketplace) in three
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towns in Western and Nyanza Provinces, Kenya.5 Daily income earners were targeted because
the project is focused upon transitory shocks to income, which are more commonly encountered
among daily income earners than in a sample of, for instance, farmers. The sample is similar to
Dupas and Robinson (2011), though drawn from di¤erent market centers. Also, the sample in
this paper includes the spouses of all participants.
The towns targeted in this study are semi-urban areas located along a major highway from
Nairobi, Kenya to Kampala, Uganda. Though many people in the area earn their living from
agriculture, a substantial fraction earn at least some income from self-employment, as is common
in the developing world (Banerjee and Duo, 2007). Many of these individuals work in town
during the day but live in the surrounding rural areas.
To recruit individuals into the study, a trained enumerator conducted a census in the market
centers of the three towns selected for the study. For the screening interview, the enumerator
approached an individual at his place of work and asked to meet with him individually for
a few minutes. The enumerator rst asked the individual if he was married, and all those
that were single were not interviewed further.6 For those who were married, the enumerator
then asked the respondent if he would be interested in participating in a project that would
take approximately 8 weeks to complete, and that would require the administration of weekly
monitoring surveys to both the respondent and his spouse. A precondition for participation was
that the enumerator be allowed to visit the spouse at home without the primary respondents
supervision. Individuals were told that the weekly monitoring survey would take approximately
1 hour per week to complete, and that they would be compensated if they agreed to participate.
If the individual was interested in the project, the enumerator took the respondents name and
contact information, and told the respondent that he would return later to begin the project.
The spouses consent was obtained later, at the rst monitoring interview.
In total, 181 married individuals were interviewed the census. Of these, 142 couples enrolled
in the full study (78.5%). Of the 39 couples who did not participate, 22 refused later (even
though they initially expressed interest), 6 could not be included because the spouse was often
away and couldnt be traced for interviews, 6 were never found after the initial interview, 2 had
5The towns were Busia, Sega, and Ugunja.
6Two individuals lied about being married and were dropped from the study.
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moved, 2 were sick, and 1 persons spouse died shortly after enrolling the study.
3.2 Experimental Income Shocks
As mentioned in the motivating framework, testing for intra-household Pareto e¢ ciency requires
identifying exogenous, transitory shocks to relative incomes. Further, the shocks must be small
enough so that they do not a¤ect intra-household bargaining weights (which may respond to
bigger shocks). To cleanly identify such shocks, this project randomly provided 150 Kenyan
shilling (about US $2.14)7 income shocks to participants at the end o¤ the weekly monitoring
visit. The probability of receiving the shock in a given week was 50% for all participants. To
make the payment of the shocks as transparent as possible, each enumerator carried with him
a black plastic bag containing 56 slips of paper with the numbers 1-56 on them. Each number
corresponded to a payment for both spouses. For each spouse, the drawing of 28 of the slips
resulted in payment, while the drawing of the other 28 resulted in no payment. The shocks were
announced to each spouse, so that each knew what the other had gotten. Payments were made
privately, however, and individuals were told that they could spend the money however they
chose.
This experimental design has several advantages. First, while the shocks are small compared
to total lifetime income, they are not trivial either - they are equivalent to approximately 1.5
daysincome for men and 7 daysincome for women (Table 2, Panel A). Second, since the shocks
were announced to both spouses and thus publicly observable (unlike many real-world shocks,
which are usually only partially observable), any observed ine¢ ciency is not attributable to the
information available to the spouse. Third, through the data collected with the monitoring sur-
veys, it is possible to compare the experimental results with real world responses to uctuations
in weekly labor income.
An important disadvantage of the study which is important to acknowledge, however, is
that (for ethical and practical reasons) the income shocks provided were always positive, unlike
real-world shocks which can of course be either positive or negative. Thus its possible that
people may have treated these payments as "windfall" income. I will attempt to address this
7The exchange rate was about 70 Kenyan shillings (Ksh) to $1 US during the study.
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in the empirical section by testing whether private expenditures respond to more natural labor
income uctuations.8 I nd qualitatively similar results from that approach.
4 Data
There are 3 main data sources in this paper. First, a background survey was administered which
included basic questions on demographics, credit, savings, asset ownership, and related issues.
An important note is that the background survey was conducted at the end of the study and
some individuals were not traced for that survey. Second, a separate survey was administered to
measure risk aversion. The survey followed Charness and Genicot (2009) and asked respondents
to choose how much of a given amount that they would like to invest in a risky asset which
paid o¤ 2.5 times the amount invested 50% of the time, but for which the amount invested was
completely lost the other 50% of the time. To ensure truth-telling, respondents were told that
one question would be picked later and actually paid out. After the survey ended, a question
was randomly picked, a coin was ipped to determine if the amount invested would be multiplied
by 2.5 or would be lost, and payouts were made.
The most important source of data, however, were the weekly monitoring surveys. For
approximately 8 weeks, a trained enumerator separately visited both spouses each week and
administered a detailed monitoring survey that included questions on consumption, expendi-
tures, income (and income shocks), and labor supply over the previous 7 days. The survey also
included information on transfers given and received, both to the spouse and to all other indi-
viduals. These transfers include cash as well as all other in-kind payments of goods or services
(respondents were asked to value these transfers themselves). Thus, these surveys should give a
comprehensive summary of all nancial transactions for each individual in every week.
The surveys were conducted privately and condentially, and information was not shared
with the spouse.9 If one of the spouses could not be found on the day of the survey, the
8The original experiment was also designed to test for limited commitment by varying the correlation in
the shocks across couples. Those correlations have no e¤ect on the basic tests performed here as the overall
probability of receiving a shock was the same in all treatment groups. In any case, the sample is balanced across
the correlations.
9 In most cases, the primary respondent was interviewed at work and the spouse at home.
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enumerator tried again for the next several days; if this individual was eventually traced, the
enumerator asked about the same time period that was asked of the spouse (the 7 days prior
to the scheduled meeting). If the individual could not be traced that week, the spouses survey
was also dropped, so the analysis to be presented below includes only those weeks in which
information is available for both spouses.
Due to some early problems with some enumerators, particularly towards the beginning of
the data collection activities, the database is trimmed of the top and bottom 1% of responses
for individual and household expenditures, as well as savings outliers. In addition, some surveys
were missing information on one of the key dependent variables necessary for the main regressions
and were therefore dropped. This leaves 898 visits for 142 couples.
4.1 Background Statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics from the background survey, as well as a check that the
randomization was implemented properly.10 First, means are reported in Columns 1 (men) and
4 (women). From Panel A (which presents demographic information), just over 84% of the men
in the sample are bicycle taxi drivers, while the rest are distributed among various other jobs.
Fifty-three percent of women report having no job. The sample is predominantly of the Luo
tribe, and the remainder is Luhya.11 The average man in the sample is 30.6 years old and has
received 7.7 years of education, while the average woman is younger (24.5) and less educated
(with 7.0 years of schooling). The average couple has 2.5 children and 3.0 dependents. Though
not shown in this Table, most respondents live in the surrounding rural areas and travel to town
for work.
Panel B presents statistics on access to savings and credit. As is common in rural Kenya,
access to formal savings and credit is very rare: just 2% of men and 1% of women have savings
10Table 1 includes information on 136 men and 131 women, out of 142 in the sample. The remainder could
not be traced for this survey (as mentioned previously, the background survey was conducted at the end of the
survey).
11The Luo are the most populous tribe in Nyanza Province (making up 53% of the Provinces population), and
the Luhya are the most populous in Western Province (making up 84% of the Population). Overall, the Luo make
up 12% of the Kenyan population and the Luhya 15% (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004).
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accounts. An equal number received a formal loan in the past year. Informal savings and credit
are common, however. Sixty-three percent of men and 44% of women participate in Rotating
Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs).12 Men and women are about equally connected to
informal credit (92% of men received a loan in the past year and 89% gave a loan, compared
to 91% and 80% of women, respectively). Panel C presents statistics on asset ownership. As
expected, men are richer than women. They own 0.79 acres of land, compared to 0.15 acres for
women. Similarly, women control a total of a bit less than 950 Ksh (US $14) worth of animals
and other durable goods, compared to more than 5,600 Ksh (US $80) for men.13
Taken together, these results suggest major di¤erences among many dimensions between men
and women in this sample. As such, di¤erences in behavior between genders may be attributable
to any number of observable or unobservable characteristics. Thus the purpose of this paper is
not to highlight level di¤erences between genders. Instead, it takes these di¤erences as given
and examines how small, transitory income shocks a¤ect household allocations.
4.2 Randomization Check
Table 1 also presents regressions to check for randomization of the experimental treatments.
As will be discussed below, the specication to test for e¢ ciency will utilize household xed
e¤ects. The identifying assumption is thus that within the household weeks in which a shock
is received by a given individual are randomly determined. However, a stronger test is that the
total number of shocks received over the entire experiment should be random across households.
Table 1 tests this by running the following regression
characteristici = 1
P8
t=1 shock
m
itP8
i=1 tracedit
+ 2
P8
t=1 shock
f
itP8
i=1 tracedit
+ "i (3)
where the dependent variable is a given background characteristic. shockmit and shock
f
it are
indicator variables for the male and female in household i receiving the experimental shock in
12That men are more likely than women to participate in ROSCAs is in contrast to, for instance, Anderson and
Baland (2002). This is likely because so many women do not have regular jobs in this sample.
13Durable goods include beds, sofas, tables, chairs, cookers, radios, TVs, mobile and landline phones, clocks,
watches, sewing machines, irons, bicycles, and bednets.
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week t, and tracedit is an indicator for being traced for the survey in week t (recall that ob-
servations are dropped if either spouse could not be traced so that households only appear if
both spouses completed the survey that week). Thus the independent variables are the empir-
ical probability that the spouse received the shock in a given week. If treatment were truly
randomized, the coe¢ cients 1 and 2 should be small and statistically insignicant for most
variables.
The coe¢ cients are reported in Columns 2-3 (men) and 5-6 (women) in Table 1. There are
few statistically signicant di¤erences across households. Men who received more shocks saved
more in ROSCAs, were more likely to give a gift or loan, and were less likely to have occupations
other than a bicycle taxi driver. Women who received more shocks were less likely to have an
occupation other than market vendor or housewife. Also, women whose husbands received more
shocks were more likely to be housewives. On the whole, however, there appear to be minimal
di¤erences even across households and the results appear consistent with random chance.
Finally, given the xed e¤ects empirical approach, another more direct test is that the shocks
should not a¤ect outcomes before they are received. As I will discuss in more detail later (when
the exact specication is discussed), I nd no e¤ects from these placebo regressions (see Appendix
Table A1) which suggests again that randomization was implemented e¤ectively.
4.3 Summary Statistics from the Monitoring Surveys
Table 2 provides some summary information from the weekly monitoring visits. Panel A presents
summary statistics on weekly labor income and hours (not including agriculture). Here, income
for those selling produce or other items (who are mostly female), is calculated as the di¤erence
in sales and money spent restocking. Of the couples sampled for the survey, men make about
719 Kenyan shillings per week (just over US $10) and women about 143 shillings (about US $2).
For men, this income comes primarily from their regular job; for women, income comes largely
from informal sources, such as occasional sales of agricultural produce, rather than regular labor
income. Even women without regular jobs earn some money: average income for such women is
53 Ksh (US $0.70) per week, compared to 231 Ksh (US $3.30) for women with jobs. In relative
terms, then, the experimental income shocks are relatively large, especially for women: the $2
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shock is equivalent to roughly 1.5 daysincome for men and over a weeks income for women. To
put this in terms of a developed country equivalent, for men, the shock is equivalent to roughly
$200 for a worker making $50,000 per year. For women, the shock is much larger, equivalent to
roughly $950.
Though consumption was recorded in the surveys, expenditures will be used in the main
specications, for several reasons. First, to reduce the length of the monitoring survey, the
consumption questions were asked only at the household level so that I do not have specic
measures of individual consumption shares and thus they would have to be imputed. Second,
the main test of e¢ ciency is the consumption of private goods (alcohol, cigarettes, soda, clothing
and shoes, hairstyling, entertainment, newspapers, own meals in restaurants, transportation and
various other items), and expenditures on these items are equal to consumption in most cases.
Any allocation of such items to others would have been recorded as in-kind transfers and, while
some items could in principle be saved for future use, empirically people usually consume these
items immediately.
Panel B presents the expenditure data. The rst row of Panel B show total expenditures: men
spent about 820 Ksh a week, compared to 369 Ksh for women. Total household expenditures are
therefore around $2.42 per day, indicating how poor these households are. The next few rows
break expenditures into various broad categories: shared food, spending on children,14 medical
expenses, other shared expenses,15 and total private expenditures. Though shared food and
other shared expenses are the biggest categories, both men and women spend substantial sums
on private items: private expenses makes up about 18% of total expenditures for men and 11%
for women.
The bottom part of the panel breaks down private expenditures into their primary compo-
nents.16 Men spend much more on meals in restaurants (usually lunch in town when they are
working) and on alcohol, soda, and cigarettes. However, women also spend relatively sizeable
amounts (given their income) on clothing for themselves and on other private items.
14This includes clothing, school fees, and school supplies.
15Other shared expenditures include cleaning supplies, rent, water, household bills, and other related expenses.
16"Other" private expenditures includes hairstyling, entertainment, newspapers, transportation, mobile phone
airtime, and related items.
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Panel C presents summary statistics on transfers (which are dened as positive for outows
and negative for inows and which include cash and in-kind transfers) between spouses and
with individuals outside of the household, and on imputed savings (estimated as the di¤erence
between total cash ows and total expenditures). In total, women receive an average of 59 Ksh
per week from their husbands, the vast majority of which are gifts rather than loans. Both men
and women regularly send and receive transfers, and overall savings levels are quite low (they are
in fact slightly negative here, which might reect some underreporting of income as is common
in surveys of this type).
5 Experimental Results
5.1 Empirical Framework
Given the experimental design, the basic regression is straightforward. I will run a reduced form
xed e¤ects specication as follows:
yjit = S
j
it + S
k
it + i + t + "
j
it (4)
where i indexes the household and t time. The regression is run separately both genders j (where
k indexes the spouse). yjit are the outcomes of interest (principally private expenditures, though
I will also present results for all other expenditure categories, as well as labor supply, transfers,
and savings). Sjit and S
k
it are the key independent variables: indicators for whether each spouse
received the experimental shock. Finally, t is a xed e¤ect for the week of the interview and
i is a household xed e¤ect. Identication therefore is based on the assumption that weeks in
which a given household receives the shock are randomly determined.17
The test of Pareto e¢ ciency is simply that the shocks only a¤ect private expenditures through
their e¤ect on the pooled budget constraint, or that:
 =  (5)
17 If the shocks are truly random, then the shocks should have no e¤ect on outcomes in the weeks before they
are received. Appendix Table A1 implements this regression and, reassuringly, nds no e¤ects from this placebo
test. This result suggests that inference will be unbiased.
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As the money may not be spent immediately, I run another specication which includes
current and lagged shocks. Nevertheless, if households save all of these transitory shocks, even
over for a few weeks (either out of a consumption smoothing motive or because they would prefer
to save up for larger purchases), it will be impossible to reject e¢ ciency as it is impossible to
tell who controls household savings with the data which is available. The e¤ects are therefore
likely a lower bound on ine¢ ciency.
5.2 Results
The results from estimating the reduced form specication (4) by xed e¤ects are presented in
Panels A (for men) and B (for women) in Table 3. For ease of interpretation, all coe¢ cients
have been divided by the size of the experimental shock (150 Kenyan shillings), so that the
coe¢ cients in the Table can be interpreted as a propensity to consume out of a shillings worth
of shock.
The rst seven rows present the expenditure results for the main categories listed in Table
2. From Panel A, the only statistically signicant increase in expenditures for men are private
expenditures (which are signicant at 1%). The estimated propensity to spend on private items
out of own income is 0.169. Interestingly, private expenditures do not change in weeks in which
the wife receives the shock (the sign is actually negative). Consequently, the null hypothesis for
e¢ ciency (that these marginal propensities are equal) can be rejected at the 5% level. Though
the other expenditure categories are less easily interpretable as a test of e¢ ciency (since they
are shared), there is little evidence of di¤erences in expenditure responses to own and spouse
shocks.
By contrast, for women, private expenditures do not respond to the shocks (received either
by herself or her husband). Private expenditures are actually slightly lower in such weeks,
though statistically insignicant. Women do spend more on medical expenses when they receive
a shock (signicant only at the 10% level), but the e¤ect is weak. There is also no discernible
e¤ect on other categories which have been associated with female preferences in other studies
(for instance, spending on children).
Columns 8 and 9 examine transfers to the spouse (these results are symmetric across spouses
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by denition, as every shilling sent by one spouse is received by the other). Men transfer 7.7% of
the shock to their wives (which is insignicant) while women transfer 16.3% to their husbands.
Both men and women also appear to transfer some outside the household in such weeks (though
the results are statistically insignicant). Columns 10-11 show that there is no discernible e¤ect
on weekly labor supply.18 Finally, Column 12 presents imputed savings. For men, it is evident
that they save much of the shock. The estimated propensity to save is lower for women, though
the standard errors are very large.19 The lower propensity is also partially attributable to the
fact that men receive some of the shock through transfers.
Since these regressions include only current outcomes on the current realization of shocks,
it is possible that they do not fully capture the dynamics of household spending (for example,
if people save the shocks over a week and spend the shocks later on). To examine this, I run
specications which also include measures for whether the respondent and his spouse received
a shock the week before. The cost of doing this is that I can only include observations which
were tracked in successive weeks. This reduces the total number of observations to 618 (from
898) and the number of households from 142 to 140.20
The results are presented in Table 4. For men (Panel A), the current week increase in
private expenditures persists. The propensity to expend is 0.215 out of own current shock
income (signicant at 1%) and 0.039 out of the wifes. Though this di¤erence is no longer
signicant due to the decreased sample size, the pattern is very similar of the main results in
Table 3. Again, there are few statistically signicant changes in other outcomes (though there
is a small decrease in labor hours which is signicant at 10%). None of the lagged shocks on
own income are signicant for men.
There are few evident trends in lagged spouses experimental income as well. One exception
is that "other shared" expenditures by men tend to decrease when their wife receives the shock
(perhaps because the wife purchases these items out of her income - indeed this seems to be the
18 It might be that the labor supply responses are over a smaller time period such as a few days (as it is among,
for instance, sex workers in this part of Kenya in Robinson and Yeh, 2011).
19The general pattern of the results look similar when conditioning on labor income, or when including an
interaction between the 2 shocks.
20Though all households were tracked for a minimum of 4 weeks, some were not found in consecutive weeks.
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case in Panel B). However, this decrease does not translate into increased spending on private
items (since the lagged spouse shocks do not a¤ect private expenditures), so this result does not
indicate a rejection of e¢ ciency.
Panel B presents results for women. Again, there is no discernible e¤ect on private expen-
ditures. Though women increase total expenditures, this is mostly in shared categories. Labor
income also appears to go down somewhat for women after the receipt of shocks, though the
e¤ect is imprecisely estimated. This could be evidence, however, that women treat own income
shocks di¤erently than spouses income shocks in determining labor supply (which would itself
be a rejection of e¢ ciency). However, the e¤ect appears to be too weak to make denitive
conclusions.21
A nal check of these results is that, if the shocks are truly random, they should have no e¤ect
on allocations before they are received. In Appendix Table A1, I regress current expenditures
on future shocks (which have not yet been received). Reassuringly, this placebo test reveals no
e¤ect of future shocks (as it should), providing condence that the results are not due to omitted
factors.
6 External Validity and Alternative Hypotheses
6.1 Behavior Outside of Experiment
While the experimental approach adopted in this paper provides a clean test of intra-household
e¢ ciency within the experiment, a drawback of the approach is that the environment is somewhat
stylized. In particular, the shocks are always positive and the experimental payout is akin to a
small "windfall" separate from their normal income source.22 While these issues are not relevant
21Another specication to deal with the possibility that money is not spent immediately is to compare total
expenditure levels over the entire experiment on the total number of shocks received. The general results look
similar from such a specication but the power is low since there is only 1 observation per household. Thus, given
that Table 4 suggests that most private spending is immediate, I do not report these results here.
22A related issue is that people may treat gains di¤erently than losses, for example because they are loss averse
(i.e. Kahneman and Tversky 1979). If so, they will tend to be risk averse over gains and risk loving over losses.
As the experiment involves only gains, loss averse individuals should have been more likely to insure each other
than they would have been for losses. Thus, loss aversion seems unlikely to explain the results.
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if people treat all sources of income similarly, I attempt to address this issue by examining labor
income uctuations outside of the experiment.
Ideally, there would be an instrumental variable which would a¤ect labor income but not
preferences or bargaining power (rainfall, for instance). If exogenous labor income changes
could be identied with this instrument, it would be possible to causally test for e¢ ciency.
Unfortunately, I do not have such an instrument (those that are potentially available, such as
sickness or other shocks) are either not strong enough to predict income or may directly a¤ect
preferences for private expenditures.
Thus, I have to rely solely on weekly labor income. To attempt to get a measure of labor
income shocks which are not due to di¤erences in work intensity, I also control for hours and
run the following regressions:
yjit = L
j
it + L
k
it + H
j
it + H
k
it + i + t + "
j
it (6)
where L and H index labor income and labor hours, respectively. Identication requires that
weekly labor income for a given household (conditional on hours) is uncorrelated with prefer-
ences. As this assumption is di¢ cult to verify with this data, the results should be taken with
some care.23
That caveat in mind, the results are very supportive of the main experimental ndings
(Table 5). As the standard errors in these regressions are smaller than in the experimental
section (given that there is more variation in income than the shock dummy), tighter inference
is possible. Most notably, both men and women spend signicantly more on private expenditures
when they earn more labor income. While the magnitudes are not very large (0.025 for men
and 0.022 for women), e¢ ciency is rejected in both cases (at the 5% level for men and the 10%
level for women). Again, the majority of these uctuations are saved which might suggest that
they are indeed transitory shocks.
While these results are speculative given the possible endogeneity of weekly labor income
even after controlling for hours, they do at least suggest that the experimental ndings were not
23Results look similar controlling for other shocks (such as sickness) though I do not include them here as that
information is missing for several respondents.
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necessarily specic to the experiment.
6.2 Alternative Hypothesis: Di¤erences in Risk Preferences
Recent work has shown that men and women have di¤erent preferences for risk. In particular,
women tend to be more risk averse than men (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). Such di¤erences
are important for the structure of risk sharing arrangements. In particular, the less risk averse
individual could insure the more risk averse individual by accepting more consumption variance
in exchange for a higher average level of consumption. Mazzocco and Saini (2010) nd evidence
for such heterogeneity across households in the ICRISAT dataset used by Townsend (1994), and
show that accounting for this makes an important di¤erence in empirical inferences.
I address this by making use of the experimentally elicited risk preferences in which individ-
uals were asked how much of 50 or 100 Ksh that they wanted to invest in a risky asset which
would pay out 2.5 the amount invested half the time but nothing the other half of the time. I
then regress this measure on an indicator for the gender of the respondent. To be as transparent
as possible, I do not include any other controls.
Results are presented in Appendix Table A2 (note that I have information here on only
129 couples). Women invest 20.4 Ksh and 44.6 Ksh of the 50 Ksh and 100 Ksh amounts,
respectively, in the asset (the constant in this regression). Men invest a bit more (2.1 and
2.4 Ksh, respectively), but these di¤erences are insignicant and very small. For example, the
standard deviation of the amount invested out of 100 Ksh is 22, so these di¤erence is equivalent
to only 0.1 of a standard deviation. I further check that these di¤erences are not driving the
results by re-running Equation (4) for spouses with similar risk preferences (those with less than
or equal to a 10 or 20 Ksh di¤erence in the amount invested).24 While the signicance is of
course reduced, the main ndings remain, suggesting that di¤erential risk preferences are not
the explanation.
24 In total, 43.4% of couples have no more than a 10 Ksh di¤erence in the amount invested, and 62.8% have no
more than a 20 Ksh di¤erence.
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7 Conclusion
Any test of intra-household risk coping must identify exogenous shocks which a¤ect relative in-
comes but do not a¤ect bargaining parameters or preferences. The contribution of this paper is
to provide random shocks in a controlled experiment among married couples in Western Kenya.
The experimental shocks are well suited for testing e¢ ciency - they are randomly determined,
transitory, idiosyncratic, and small relative to lifetime income. They are also perfectly observ-
able (because they were announced to both spouses), so that information asymmetries are not
relevant. Thus, the experiment represents a particularly direct and easily interpretable test of
Pareto e¢ ciency.
The results suggests that risk sharing is incomplete and that e¢ ciency is not achieved. More
speculative evidence further suggests that even outside of the experiment, these couples do not
achieve e¢ ciency over weekly labor uctuations. Despite the prevalence of income shocks in this
part of Kenya, it appears that spouses do not fully insure each other.
Understanding the e¤ectiveness of intra-household risk coping is important because numerous
other studies have shown that both inter-temporal and inter-household risk mechanisms are
only partially e¤ective (including several studies in this part of Kenya). If potentially insurable
individual risk is not insured even within the household, then it strongly suggests that the
provision of more formal risk coping devices (at the individual level) could have large e¤ects.
For example, other work with a very similar population of daily income earners suggests that,
while female market vendors are quite vulnerable to income shocks and disinvest in the business
when shocks hit, providing even simple savings accounts can mitigate this vulnerability (Dupas
and Robinson, 2011). Similar interventions seem well worth exploring given the incompleteness
of informal risk sharing, both within and across households.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Respondent Spouse Mean Respondent Spouse
Panel A. Demographic Information
Occupation:
  Bicycle Taxi Driver 0.84 0.20 -0.13 0.00 - -
(0.17) (0.18) - -
  Market Stall 0.05 0.10 -0.09 0.31 0.24 -0.30
(0.09) (0.10) (0.22) (0.21)
  Housewife / no job 0.02 -0.07 0.09 0.53 0.06 0.41
(0.05) (0.06) (0.23) (0.23)*
  Other 0.09 -0.29 0.11 0.15 -0.29 -0.11
(0.13)** (0.14) (0.17)* (0.16)
Luo Tribe 0.88 -0.06 0.21 0.86 0.00 0.03
(0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16)
Age 30.57 -0.54 4.53 24.47 1.20 -3.33
(8.71) (3.93) (4.15) (6.83) (3.23) (3.14)
Education 7.72 -0.96 1.29 7.02 -1.25 -1.03
(2.41) (1.10) (1.16) (2.07) (1.01) (0.96)
Literate (Swahili) 0.85 0.12 -0.04 0.72 -0.03 0.23
(0.36) (0.16) (0.17) (0.45) (0.21) (0.21)
Number of children 2.45 -0.49 -0.06 2.45 -0.06 -0.49
(1.75) (0.81) (0.83) (1.75) (0.83) (0.81)
Number of dependents2 2.95 0.68 -0.63 2.95 -0.63 0.68
(2.05) (0.96) (0.99) (2.05) (0.99) (0.96)
Panel B. Savings and Credit
Has Formal Savings Account 0.02 0.03 -0.06 0.01 -0.03 0.01
(0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04)
Received Formal Loan 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.01
  in past year (0.15) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04)
Participates in ROSCA 0.63 0.24 0.00 0.44 -0.06 -0.12
(0.48) (0.23) (0.23) (0.50) (0.24) (0.23)
Amount Saved in ROSCAs 3097 4636 2310 2035 -56 445
  (for those in ROSCAs) (4733) (2,545)* (2809) (3200) (2571) (2131)
Received gift or loan 0.92 0.10 0.01 0.91 0.11 0.02
  in past year (0.27) (0.12) (0.13) (0.29) (0.14) (0.13)
Amount received in gifts and 2393 225 1178 1589 332 -683
  loans in past year (2593) (1171) (1236) (2083) (987) (959)
Gave gift or loan 0.89 0.26 0.02 0.80 -0.05 0.06
  in past year (0.32) (0.14)* (0.15) (0.40) (0.19) (0.19)
Amount given in gifts and 1806 298 -169 930 -287 -919
  loans in past year (2944) (1337) (1410) (1428) (673) (654)
Panel C. Asset Ownership
Acres of land owned 0.79 -0.71 0.02 0.15 -0.04 0.01
(1.64) (0.74) (0.78) (0.50) (0.24) (0.23)
Value of Durable Goods 2708 1646 334 797 268 -662
  Owned (4570) (2066) (2181) (1652) (782) (760)
Value of Animals Owned 2914 10784 -3987 145 299 -16
(15635) (7017) (7407) (838) (397) (386)
Amount invested (out of 100 46.98 -11.06 5.51 44.57 -9.60 -4.47
  Ksh) in Risky Asset3 (22.17) (10.13) (10.61) (21.87) (10.48) (10.01)
Observations 136 131
Coefficient of Regression of Dep. Var. on 
Ave. Num of Shocks Received by:1
MALES FEMALES
Coefficient of Regression of Dep. Var. on 
Ave. Num of Shocks Received by:
Notes:  All figures are self-reported means. There are a fewer observations than in the monitoring surveys (in which there are 142 
couples) because the background survey was administered after the project started and some could not be traced for this survey. All 
monetary figures in Kenyan shillings. Exchange rate was roughly 70 Kenyan shillings to $1 US during this time period.
Columns 1 and 4: standard deviations in parentheses. Columns 2-3 and 5-6: standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
1These are coefficients of a regression of the dependent variable on the probability that the respondent received the experimental 
shock over the 8 weeks of the experiment (the total number of shocks divided by the number of weeks). The probability is used rather 
than the total number of shocks because some respondents weren't traced in some weeks.
2The number of dependents must be the same within the household. In cases where responses differ, the wife's response is used.
3The risky asset paid off 2.5 times the amount invested with probability 50%, and 0 with probability 50%.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics from Monitoring Surveys
(1) (2)
Male Female
Panel A. Income
Total Labor Income 718.64 143.01
(746.15) (573.68)
Total Hours Worked 55.35 16.47
(65.42) (33.04)
Panel B. Expenditures
Total Expenditures 820.05 369.21
(525.34) (397.01)
   Shared Food 380.51 192.67
(274.09) (203.02)
   Children 18.77 16.61
(71.10) (54.54)
   Medical 42.59 25.34
(103.42) (90.75)
   Other Shared 126.72 59.92
(228.13) (119.09)
   Transportation 107.98 34.75
(121.14) (113.29)
   Total Private 143.71 39.92
(161.32) (92.32)
Private Categories
   Clothing 21.41 21.87
(85.65) (77.54)
   Meals in Restaurants 71.75 5.33
(76.08) (24.28)
   Alcohol, Soda, Cigarettes 28.04 4.39
(51.52) (17.97)
   Other Private Expenditures 22.49 8.34
(74.95) (25.11)
Panel C. Transfers and Savings
(Net) Transfers to Spouse 59.46 -59.46
(147.44) (147.44)
(Net) Transfers Outside HH 11.03 6.28
(371.85) (326.65)
Savings -23.34 -52.00
(863.52) (642.60)
Observations 898 898
Number of IDs 142 142
Notes: In Panel B, "Total private" expenditures include the 
subcategories listed in the bottom of the Panel. The "other private 
expenditures" category includes hairstyling, entertainment, 
newspapers, transportation, mobile phone airtime, and similar items. 
Shared food includes all food consumed jointly at home. Spending on 
children includes school fees, school supplies, and clothing. Other 
shared expenditures includes cleaning supplies, rent, water, 
household bills, and related expenses.  In Panel C, transfers are 
defined as positive for outflows and negative for inflows and include 
cash and in-kind transfers. Savings are imputed as the sum of total 
income (including the experimental shocks), transfers, and bank and 
ROSCA flows minus total expenditures. 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 3. Experimental Shocks on Individual-Level Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Total Private Shared Medical Children Other Transport Spouse Outside Hours Labor
Food Shared Household Income
Panel A. Men
Respondent Received Shock 0.190 0.169 -0.025 0.048 -0.012 -0.096 0.102 0.077 0.090 0.018 0.139 0.937
(0.194) (0.064)*** (0.089) (0.041) (0.032) (0.102) (0.068) (0.065) (0.202) (0.017) (0.366) (0.421)**
Spouse Received Shock -0.163 -0.027 -0.016 0.057 -0.019 -0.086 -0.069 -0.163 -0.133 -0.036 -0.145 0.584
(0.192) (0.069) (0.087) (0.045) (0.030) (0.111) (0.060) (0.060)*** (0.157) (0.035) (0.312) (0.366)
Observations 898 898 898 898 898 898 898 898 898 898 898 898
Number of Households 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142
F-test of equality 0.21 0.05** 0.93 0.84 0.88 0.95 0.09* 0.001*** 0.31 0.27 0.48 0.54
Mean of Dependent Variable (Ksh)1 889.32 135.66 413.77 56.95 24.09 144.77 114.55 76.78 2.81 52.18 698.56 -250.99
S.D. of Dep. Var. (Ksh) 557.30 122.24 298.74 143.25 84.40 250.88 106.76 159.89 436.18 24.14 852.24 877.03
Panel B. Women
Respondent Received Shock 0.180 -0.020 0.056 0.079 0.032 0.041 -0.007 0.163 0.050 -0.031 -0.020 0.403
(0.148) (0.042) (0.067) (0.041)* (0.026) (0.059) (0.047) (0.060)*** (0.190) (0.020) (0.185) (0.275)
Spouse Received Shock -0.058 -0.026 -0.051 0.015 -0.025 0.050 -0.021 -0.077 -0.010 0.009 0.031 0.298
(0.123) (0.039) (0.064) (0.034) (0.024) (0.041) (0.039) (0.065) (0.160) (0.011) (0.195) (0.266)
Observations 898 898 898 898 898 898 898 898 898 898 898 898
Number of Households 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142
F-test of equality 0.14 0.91 0.23 0.07* 0.1* 0.88 0.77 0.001*** 0.63 0.14 0.86 0.77
Mean of Dependent Variable (Ksh) 428.51 47.28 227.98 28.43 18.25 68.51 38.07 -76.78 -11.15 16.77 165.33 -127.78
S.D. of Dep. Var. (Ksh) 482.65 123.77 262.65 94.87 65.80 119.21 101.60 159.89 549.09 24.88 604.19 715.34
Net Transfers To: Labor Supply Savings2
Notes: All regressions are estimated by fixed effects with controls for the week of the interview. All coefficients are divided by 150 shillings, the size of the experimental shock (including hours). See 
Table 2 for explanations of the various expenditure categories.
Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
1The mean and standard deviation reported here is for weeks when neither spouse receives the shock.
2Savings are imputed as the sum of labor and experimental income, transfers, ROSCA payouts, and bank withdrawals minus total expenditures. ROSCA and bank withdrawals are not reported to 
save space.
Expenditures
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Table 4. Current and Lagged Experimental Shocks on Individual-Level Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Total Total Shared Medical Children Other Transport Spouse Outside Hours Labor
Private Food Shared Household Income
Panel A. Men
Respondent Received Shock this week 0.431 0.215 0.188 0.042 -0.008 -0.138 0.132 0.125 -0.089 -0.039 -0.321 0.249
(0.245)* (0.081)*** (0.117) (0.051) (0.036) (0.124) (0.082) (0.079) (0.185) (0.022)* (0.534) (0.593)
Respondent Received Shock last week 0.055 0.039 -0.015 -0.059 -0.020 0.064 0.047 0.048 -0.107 -0.059 -0.440 -0.476
(0.227) (0.075) (0.132) (0.046) (0.030) (0.112) (0.063) (0.072) (0.139) (0.047) (0.522) (0.570)
Spouse Received Shock this week -0.082 0.067 0.114 0.031 -0.037 -0.228 -0.028 -0.167 -0.274 -0.041 -0.530 0.217
(0.200) (0.067) (0.101) (0.050) (0.035) (0.132)* (0.070) (0.060)*** (0.166) (0.059) (0.468) (0.496)
Spouse Received Shock last week -0.285 0.011 0.079 -0.049 -0.070 -0.304 0.049 -0.060 0.147 0.005 -0.190 -0.126
(0.209) (0.062) (0.112) (0.045) (0.041)* (0.150)** (0.054) (0.080) (0.233) (0.013) (0.410) (0.490)
Observations 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611
Number of Households 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140
p-value for test:
  Respondent shock = spouse shock (this week) 0.1* 0.12 0.62 0.83 0.55 0.63 0.12 0.001*** 0.48 0.97 0.58 0.96
  Respondent shock = spouse shock (last week) 0.28 0.79 0.61 0.89 0.31 0.06* 0.98 0.33 0.33 0.19 0.76 0.70
  Respondent shock this week + last week = 0 0.23 0.06* 0.46 0.83 0.55 0.69 0.13 0.12 0.35 0.14 0.45 0.81
  Spouse shock this week + last week = 0 0.18 0.43 0.25 0.78 0.1* 0.01*** 0.83 0.02** 0.68 0.57 0.17 0.88
  Sum respondent shocks = sum spouse shocks 0.08* 0.29 0.95 1.00 0.26 0.08* 0.31 0.02** 0.86 0.33 0.97 0.75
Mean of Dependent Variable (Ksh)1 760.20 114.64 356.01 34.69 18.81 142.85 93.20 64.88 52.95 55.33 768.13 -87.03
S.D. of Dep. Var. (Ksh) 508.59 92.01 303.29 91.17 58.62 214.88 88.06 107.20 156.32 21.39 1259.78 1051.85
Expenditures Net Transfers To: Labor Supply Savings2
Notes: All regressions are estimated by fixed effects with controls for the week of the interview. All coefficients are divided by 150 shillings, the size of the experimental shock (including hours). See Table 2 for 
explanations of the various expenditure categories.
Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
1The mean and standard deviation reported here is for weeks when neither spouse receives the shock.
2Savings are imputed as the sum of labor and experimental income, transfers, ROSCA payouts, and bank withdrawals minus total expenditures. ROSCA and bank withdrawals are not reported to save space.
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Table 4. Current and Lagged Experimental Shocks on Individual-Level Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Total Total Shared Medical Children Other Transport Spouse Outside Hours Labor
Private Food Shared Household Income
Panel B. Women
Respondent Received Shock this week 0.434 -0.009 0.107 0.083 0.048 0.126 0.079 0.167 -0.119 -0.026 -0.141 0.222
(0.190)** (0.064) (0.076) (0.084) (0.030) (0.078) (0.061) (0.060)*** (0.170) (0.025) (0.241) (0.306)
Respondent Received Shock last week 0.012 0.013 -0.136 0.074 -0.005 0.058 0.008 0.060 -0.105 -0.024 -0.374 -0.508
(0.232) (0.055) (0.064)** (0.060) (0.036) (0.108) (0.073) (0.080) (0.144) (0.010)** (0.215)* (0.270)*
Spouse Received Shock this week 0.101 -0.020 -0.032 0.055 0.008 0.063 0.027 -0.125 -0.133 0.012 -0.244 -0.041
(0.148) (0.058) (0.067) (0.050) (0.029) (0.056) (0.041) (0.079) (0.146) (0.011) (0.233) (0.288)
Spouse Received Shock last week -0.230 0.066 -0.139 -0.030 0.015 -0.138 -0.004 -0.048 0.216 -0.029 -0.197 -0.203
(0.222) (0.080) (0.079)* (0.075) (0.026) (0.095) (0.057) (0.072) (0.127)* (0.023) (0.267) (0.312)
Observations 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611
Number of Households 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140
p-value for test:
  Respondent shock = spouse shock (this week) 0.09* 0.89 0.20 0.63 0.30 0.38 0.34 0.001*** 0.92 0.21 0.78 0.53
  Respondent shock = spouse shock (last week) 0.55 0.58 0.98 0.37 0.65 0.29 0.92 0.33 0.19 0.86 0.67 0.50
  Respondent shock this week + last week = 0 0.23 0.97 0.78 0.21 0.43 0.30 0.27 0.02** 0.40 0.09* 0.06* 0.50
  Spouse shock this week + last week = 0 0.62 0.70 0.12 0.69 0.57 0.45 0.76 0.12 0.65 0.46 0.29 0.59
  Sum respondent shocks = sum spouse shocks 0.26 0.79 0.36 0.40 0.75 0.27 0.58 0.02** 0.35 0.14 0.88 0.95
Mean of Dependent Variable (Ksh)1 356.01 51.81 178.49 34.50 12.69 51.52 27.00 -64.88 18.76 14.54 162.75 -91.40
S.D. of Dep. Var. (Ksh) 432.48 154.72 190.52 121.84 58.01 98.90 59.16 107.20 262.05 23.46 848.83 834.79
Expenditures Net Transfers To: Labor Supply Savings2
Notes: All regressions are estimated by fixed effects with controls for the week of the interview. All coefficients are divided by 150 shillings, the size of the experimental shock (including hours). See Table 2 for 
explanations of the various expenditure categories.
Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
1The mean and standard deviation reported here is for weeks when neither spouse receives the shock.
2Savings are imputed as the sum of labor and experimental income, transfers, ROSCA payouts, and bank withdrawals minus total expenditures. ROSCA and bank withdrawals are not reported to save space.
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Table 5. Response to Labor Income Fluctuations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Total Private Shared Medical Children Other Transport Spouse Outside
Food Shared Household
Panel A. Men
Respondent Labor Income 0.184 0.025 0.041 0.012 0.002 0.075 0.029 -0.006 0.090 0.799
(0.039)*** (0.013)* (0.016)** (0.017) (0.003) (0.046) (0.011)*** (0.010) (0.040)** (0.031)***
Spouse Labor Income -0.005 -0.004 -0.014 0.008 -0.001 0.010 -0.005 0.007 -0.016 0.005
(0.031) (0.005) (0.008) (0.015) (0.003) (0.018) (0.006) (0.014) (0.022) (0.041)
Observations 898 898 898 898 898 898 898 898 898 898
Number of Households 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142
F-test of equality 0.001*** 0.04** 0.001*** 0.87 0.51 0.19 0.01*** 0.55 0.02** 0.001***
Mean of Dependent Variable (Ksh)1 820.05 143.71 380.51 42.59 18.77 126.72 107.98 59.46 11.03 -23.34
S.D. of Dep. Var. (Ksh) 525.34 161.32 274.09 103.42 71.10 228.13 121.14 147.44 371.85 863.52
Panel B. Women
Respondent Labor Income 0.126 0.022 0.057 0.008 0.010 0.027 0.003 -0.007 0.083 0.843
(0.044)*** (0.006)*** (0.031)* (0.011) (0.006)* (0.009)*** (0.006) (0.014) (0.024)*** (0.054)***
Spouse Labor Income 0.036 0.010 0.011 0.002 0.001 0.013 0.000 0.006 -0.024 0.011
(0.013)*** (0.004)*** (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006)** (0.004) (0.010) (0.014)* (0.034)
Observations 898 898 898 898 898 898 898 898 898 898
Number of Households 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142
F-test of equality 0.07* 0.07* 0.17 0.58 0.13 0.15 0.64 0.55 0.001*** 0.001***
Mean of Dependent Variable (Ksh) 369.21 39.92 192.67 25.34 16.61 59.92 34.75 -59.46 6.28 -52.00
S.D. of Dep. Var. (Ksh) 397.01 92.32 203.02 90.75 54.54 119.09 113.29 147.44 326.65 642.60
Net Transfers To: Savings2Expenditures
Notes: All regressions are estimated by fixed effects with controls for the week of the interview. All regressions also control for labor hours for both spouses. All coefficients are 
divided by 150 shillings, the size of the experimental shock (including hours). See Table 2 for explanations of the various expenditure categories.
Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
1The mean and standard deviation reported here is over all weeks.
2Savings are imputed as the sum of labor and experimental income, transfers, ROSCA payouts, and bank withdrawals minus total expenditures. ROSCA and bank withdrawals are 
not reported to save space.
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Appendix Table A1. Placebo Test - Outcomes on Shocks Received the Following Week
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Total Private Shared Medical Children Other Transport Spouse Outside Hours Labor
Food Shared Household Income
Panel A. Men
Respondent Received Shock -0.100 -0.043 0.021 -0.028 -0.094 0.130 -0.085 0.020 0.031 0.007 -0.350 -0.618
  Following Week (0.222) (0.087) (0.098) (0.048) (0.062) (0.121) (0.061) (0.068) (0.223) (0.013) (0.295) (0.447)
Spouse Received Shock 0.220 -0.047 0.159 0.030 0.044 0.072 -0.035 0.075 0.384 0.040 -0.055 -0.467
   Following Week (0.237) (0.099) (0.130) (0.078) (0.047) (0.119) (0.058) (0.067) (0.228)* (0.045) (0.340) (0.444)
Observations 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611
Number of Households 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140
F-test of equality 0.28 0.98 0.41 0.47 0.07* 0.62 0.57 0.53 0.20 0.45 0.35 0.74
Mean of Dependent Variable (Ksh)1 824.52 159.91 349.91 42.23 37.45 121.34 113.69 65.36 12.70 56.17 732.75 9.54
S.D. of Dep. Var. (Ksh) 494.83 157.13 258.07 128.76 119.53 195.20 121.70 153.10 419.72 21.52 777.58 774.48
Panel B. Women
Respondent Received Shock 0.099 0.027 -0.089 0.037 0.019 0.014 0.090 -0.075 0.108 -0.028 0.238 0.306
  Following Week (0.175) (0.043) (0.100) (0.052) (0.028) (0.049) (0.052)* (0.067) (0.144) (0.023) (0.186) (0.316)
Spouse Received Shock -0.180 -0.031 -0.051 -0.083 -0.013 0.026 -0.027 -0.020 0.074 0.006 -0.006 0.001
   Following Week (0.169) (0.062) (0.092) (0.053) (0.028) (0.047) (0.050) (0.068) (0.126) (0.017) (0.168) (0.316)
Observations 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611
Number of Households 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140
F-test of equality 0.24 0.42 0.77 0.20 0.34 0.86 0.12 0.53 0.82 0.35 0.35 0.54
Mean of Dependent Variable (Ksh) 388.75 45.08 217.91 30.94 14.24 52.71 27.88 -65.36 -27.16 16.73 83.72 -102.75
S.D. of Dep. Var. (Ksh) 359.78 107.53 225.50 83.21 38.11 70.41 61.88 153.10 196.73 24.68 309.86 462.74
Expenditures Net Transfers To: Labor Supply Savings2
Notes: All regressions are estimated by fixed effects with controls for the week of the interview. All coefficients are divided by 150 shillings, the size of the experimental shock (including hours). See
explanations of the various expenditure categories.
Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
1The mean and standard deviation reported here is over those weeks when neither spouse receives the shock (for those households who have information on current and future shocks).
2Savings are imputed as the sum of labor and experimental income, transfers, ROSCA payouts, and bank withdrawals minus total expenditures. ROSCA and bank withdrawals are not reported to s
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Appendix Table A2. Gender Differences in Risk Aversion
(1) (2)
50 Ksh 100 Ksh
Male 2.09 2.40
(1.37) (2.74)
Constant 20.39 44.57
(0.97)*** (1.94)***
Observations 258 258
Amount Invested in a Risky Gamble out of:
Notes: There are no other covariates included so the constant represents the 
mean for women. The risky gamble paid off 2.5 times the amount invested with 
probability 50% and 0 with probability 50%. 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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